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Summary
This report describes safeguards implementation in Finland in 2006. The report covers the 
legal basis for safeguards, activities of license holders, the inventories of the nuclear mate-
rials, the inspections performed by STUK, the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, 
and the European Union, the implementation of the Additional Protocol, the safeguards for 
ﬁnal disposal and ﬁnally, the statement of the Finnish nuclear safeguards during the year 
2006.
HÄMÄLÄINEN Marko (ed.). Nucler safeguards in Finland 2006. STUK-B 74. Helsinki 2007.  
29 pp. + Annexes 3 pp.
Keywords: non-proliferation, nuclear materials, safeguards, illicit trafﬁcking, nuclear smuggling, 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT)
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The peaceful use of nuclear materials has to be 
guaranteed by the most credible way. The national 
nuclear safeguards system has been established for 
this purpose: to ensure that the nuclear materials, 
equipment and technology are used only for the de-
clared, peaceful purposes. The national safeguards 
system cooperates with the Euratom safeguards 
system and with the IAEA.
The Finnish safeguards system comprises the 
authorities and licence holders. Functioning of the 
national system is subject to international control. 
Undistributed responsibility on safety, security 
and safeguarding of its nuclear materials is on the 
licence holder. It is the responsibility of the com-
petent state authority to ensure that the licence 
holders comply with the requirements of the safe-
guards agreement.
1 Introduction
Nuclear materials safeguards apply to:
• nuclear materials (special ﬁssionable material 
and source material)
• other nuclear items (components, equipment, 
materials suitable for producing nuclear energy 
or for nuclear weapons, agreements and tech-
nology)
• licence holders’ activities, expertise, prepared-
ness and competence
• R&D activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle
• the manufacturing and the export control of the 
dual use equipments, 
• nuclear security, and
• the safeguards for the ﬁnal disposal.
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2 Finnish national safeguards system
2.1 Legal basis
The basis of the national safeguards is comprised 
of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree. By 
virtue of the Act STUK issues detailed regulations 
(YVL Guides) that apply to the safe use of nuclear 
energy. The main guides related to safeguards are:
• Control of nuclear fuel and other nuclear mate-
rials required in the operation of nuclear power 
plants (Guide YVL 6.1)
• The national system of accounting for and con-
trol of nuclear materials (Guide YVL 6.9)
• Reports to be submitted on nuclear materials 
(Guide YVL 6.10).
Finland was the ﬁrst state where the INFCIRC/153-
type safeguards agreement with the IAEA entered 
into force (INFCIRC/155, February 9, 1972). This 
agreement was suspended after Finland joined to 
the European Union and the agreement between 
the non-nuclear weapon States of the EU, the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) entered into force in 
Finland on October 1, 1995.
The national safeguards system was main-
tained after Finland joined the EU and to the 
Euratom safeguards system on January 1, 1995. 
The basic motivation for maintaining the national 
system has to do with the responsibilities assumed 
by the state following the NPT. The Euratom safe-
guards is based on the Euratom Treaty and the 
Commission Regulation No. 302/2005, which came 
into force in 20 March 2005. Reporting format of 
the Commission Regulation No. 3227/76 is still 
used by Finnish operators.
Finland signed the Additional Protocol in 
Vienna, 22 September 1998, with the other EU 
member states and ratiﬁed it in August 2000. The 
AP entered into force in April 30, 2004 after all the 
EU countries ratiﬁed it.
Finland has several bilateral agreements in 
the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Upon 
joining to the EU, the agreements with Australia, 
Canada and the USA were partly substituted by 
the Euratom agreements with these states. Also the 
agreements with Sweden and the UK have partly 
been expired. The old agreement made with the 
Soviet Union was continued for ﬁve years in 1999 
and the negotiations with the Russian Federation 
about new agreement have been started.
2.2 Parties of the Finnish 
safeguards system
2.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible 
for non-proliferation policy and the international 
agreements. The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
is responsible for highest management and control 
of nuclear energy in Finland. It is responsible for 
legislation related to nuclear energy and it is also 
the competent safeguards authority mentioned in 
the Euratom Treaty. Also other ministries, such 
as the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of 
Defence are contributing to the efﬁcient function of 
the national safeguards system.
2.2.2 STUK
According to the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK 
is responsible to maintain the national safeguards 
system in order to prevent the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons. It regulates the license holders’ ac-
tivities and ensures that the obligations of inter-
national agreements concerning peaceful use of 
nuclear materials are met. Regulatory control of 
STUK is directed at the possession, manufacture, 
production, transfer, handling, use, storage, trans-
port, export and import of nuclear material and 
other nuclear items.
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STUK takes care of the approval of the IAEA 
and the consultation of Commission inspectors 
for Finland. STUK shall approve an inspector if 
his activities are not considered to endanger the 
safe use of nuclear energy or the prevention of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. If STUK can not 
approve an inspector, it shall assign the approval 
to the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
The safeguards implementation by STUK cov-
ers all the typical measures of the State System of 
Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(SSAC). In addition, STUK has its own independ-
ent audit and veriﬁcation programme particularly 
for the spent nuclear fuel to ensure the complete-
ness and correctness of the operator data. The safe-
guards implementation in national level is closely 
linked with other functions like export/import con-
trol, customs and border control, transport safety, 
preventing of illicit trafﬁcking, physical protec-
tion and certain measures of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The transportation of nuclear and other radio-
active materials are very closely linked to the safe-
guards objectives. In Finland, STUK’s safeguards 
section is responsible to regulate the radioactive 
material transportations and acceptance of the 
transport packages. Finland, being the eastern 
border of the EU, has an important role taking care 
of the prevention of illicit trafﬁcking of nuclear ma-
terials. STUK cooperates closely with the Finnish 
Customs and offers its expertise to develop the 
monitoring of radioactive materials on the borders, 
and also to train the Custom ofﬁcers.
In 2006 STUK has set up an interdivisional 
Nuclear Security Task Group in order to improve 
our internal coordination on this topic and to act 
as the focal point at STUK for issues dealing with 
nuclear security, counter-terrorism and radiologi-
cal risk reduction.
At STUK, safeguards duties belong to 
the Nuclear Waste and Materials Regulation 
Department (see organization chart, Figure 1). 
The department has 22 staff members and the 
following duties: nuclear waste management, na-
tional data centre for the CTBT (Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty), and nuclear materials 
regulation, including transportation of radioac-
tive materials. The director of the department is 
Mr Tero Varjoranta. In addition to the Nuclear 
Materials Section, two key staff members deal with 
safeguards: Ms Arja Tanninen, deputy director, is 
responsible for licensing issues related to nuclear 
materials; Mr Juha Rautjärvi coordinates the nu-
Organisation
DG's Office
DG JUKKA LAAKSONEN
Administration
Public Communication
Emergency Preparedness
Expert Services
Non-ionising Radiation
Nuclear Waste and Materials Regulation
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Radiation Practices Regulation
Research and Environmental Surveillance
Information management
Director TERO VARJORANTA
Management Support
National Data Center for Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Regulation of Nuclear Waste
Regulation of Nuclear Material
Figure 1. Nuclear Materials Section in the organisation 
of STUK.
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Figure 2. Staff of Nuclear Materials Section: front 
Jaakko Tikkinen, Anna Lahkola, Marko Hämäläinen and 
Paula Karhu, behind Arto Isolankila, Elina Martikka, Olli 
Okko and Tapani Honkamaa. Out of the picture Kauko 
Karila.
• Ms Elina Martikka, Section Head (national sys-
tem, Additional Protocol (AP) implementation)
• Mr Tapani Honkamaa, Senior Inspector (Non-
Destructive Analysis (NDA), coordinator of FIN 
SP to IAEA safeguards)
• Mr Marko Hämäläinen, Inspector (inspections, 
AP implementation)
• Mr Kauko Karila, Inspector (reporting, docu-
mentation); retired 1.11.2006
• Mr Olli Okko, Senior Inspector (research and 
development (R&D), ﬁnal disposal)
• Mr Jaakko Tikkinen, Senior Inspector (trans-
portation, illicit trafﬁcking); on leave 9.1.2007 
to 31.12.2007
• Ms Anna Lahkola, Inspector (reporting, trans-
portation)
• Ms Paula Karhu, Inspector (nuclear security, 
new veriﬁcation methods)
• Mr. Arto Isolankila, Senior Inspector (NDC).
2.2.3 Operators
An essential party to the national safeguards sys-
tem are the operators. The operators perform a key 
function of the State’s safeguards system with re-
gard to nuclear material accountancy at the facil-
ity level and to control of the authentic source data 
of the nuclear materials. The operators have to 
prepare a Nuclear Material Handbook that covers 
all the information on how the safeguards in their 
facility are implemented. The Handbook, which is 
also a part of the facility’s quality system, is ap-
proved by STUK.
clear safeguards co-operation programme with the 
Russian Federation, and contributes to the non-
proliferation issues. 
Eight experts were working in the Nuclear 
Materials Section and one expert was working for 
NDC in 2006:
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3 Themes of the year
3.1 Safeguards and security
In today’s world nuclear security is more important 
than ever. In 2006 STUK has set up an interdivi-
sional Nuclear Security Task Group in order to 
improve our internal coordination on this topic and 
to act as the focal point at STUK for issues deal-
ing with nuclear security, counter-terrorism and 
radiological risk reduction. Safeguards contributes 
to security, through established accountancy and 
reporting systems as well as the technical veriﬁca-
tion and surveillance methods. In 2006 strategic 
work was started in order to integrate nuclear se-
curity considerations to our safeguards and trans-
port control duties – we will look for synergies be-
tween existing systems, such as registers of mate-
rials and sources vis-à-vis emergency preparedness 
procedures. Safeguards and our related tasks with 
transport and border control as well as import and 
export control are also tied to the fulﬁlment of our 
obligations set by international agreements such 
as the UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
STUK cooperates with the Finnish Customs 
in order to prevent illicit trafﬁcking of radioactive 
and nuclear material into Finland. In the 1990’s 
there were several shipments for which the entry 
into Finland was denied due to undeclared ra-
dioactivity in the cargo. The cause for denial was 
typically contaminated material or orphan sealed 
sources among recycled metal. The denials peaked 
in 1997 at 23 shipments being returned. Thanks 
to enhanced border monitoring, especially at the 
Russian side, the number of such cases reduced to 
zero by 2001 and has stayed zero since. Cooperation 
programmes in prevention of illicit trafﬁcking have 
been established with neighbouring countries.
STUK continues to participate and develop its 
activities in the international fora for enhancing 
nuclear security and for preventing illicit activi-
ties related to radioactive and nuclear materials. 
In 2006 STUK participated in the eleventh annual 
meeting of the International Technical Working 
Group of Nuclear Smuggling (ITWG), which ad-
dresses the technical means to detect illicit traf-
ﬁcking, organisational preparedness for response 
in detected cases, exchange of information and 
attribution of detected materials through nuclear 
forensic analysis. STUK participated in a seminar 
organised jointly by the Finnish EU Presidency, the 
incoming German Precidency and the European 
Commission as part of the European Radiological 
Risk Reduction Programme. The seminar concen-
trated on the detection of illicit trafﬁcking at key 
transit nodal points. STUK organised the second 
informal national meeting on nuclear security – we 
enjoy an atmosphere of good cooperation between 
different authorities.
3.2 National strategy for nuclear 
material veriﬁcation
STUK began programmatic NDA (Non-Destructive 
Analysis) veriﬁcations at Olkiluoto Spent fuel stor-
age at the end of 1980’s. The work is ongoing. In 
2006 STUK wrote down the strategy for nuclear 
material veriﬁcation for the years 2007–2011.
3.2.1 Strategic objectives
The strategic objectives of measurement program 
are:
• to systematically verify that the data provided 
by the operator is correct and complete.
• to maintain national preparedness for veriﬁca-
tion
• to minimise the risk of mismanagement
• to increase the motivation of the operator to its 
own NMAC (Nuclear Material Accountancy and 
Control)
• to increase the conﬁdence of international com-
munity in the Finnish national system
• to prepare for ﬁnal disposal of spent fuel by col-
lecting independent experimental radiological 
data from spent fuel assemblies as a function of 
time.
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• to maintain the competence in STUK
• to support the development of measurement 
methodologies
• to verify not only NMAC related but also nu-
clear safety related issues.
The proposed strategy will promote these objec-
tives. The numerical goal is to measure annually 
so many assemblies that the risk of unobserved 
diversion of one signiﬁcant quantity of nuclear ma-
terial is less than 10% during over 20 years time of 
programmatic measurements.
3.2.2 Present operational veriﬁcation 
tools and methodologies
List of the methods and tools is presented in 
Table 1. The characteristics of different measuring 
equipment are described in more detail in various 
technical reports. An overall view of STUK’s meas-
uring activities can be obtained from the reference 
[Honkamaa T, Hämäläinen M, How STUK veriﬁes 
spent fuel – and why? Proceedings of ESARDA, 25th 
Annual Meeting, Stockholm, May 2003, available 
on CD, ISBN 92-894-5654-X]. Additionally, in 2006 
STUK acquired an Ortec Detective. It is an electri-
cally cooled portable HPGe detector and analyser, 
which is also an excellent tool for Spent Nuclear 
Fuel veriﬁcations. In 2007 STUK plans to use it 
in some of the activities. Otherwise the measuring 
systems are the same as in the year 2005.
The veriﬁcation toolbox is adequate to run the 
regular measuring programme typically consisting 
of two inspections per nuclear power plant per year 
and all types of fuel.
3.2.3 Assembly types and locations
The strategy will take into account the different 
types of assemblies. In Olkiluoto 1–2 BWR’s old-
er types of assemblies can be veriﬁed with the 
present SFAT device without fuel movements. New 
types of assemblies should be measured with an-
other technology, such as a FORK detector or the 
GBUV method, which require fuel assembly move-
ments. However, at ﬁrst STUK aims to upgrade its 
present SFAT device to improve its detection capa-
bility with a better large size CdZnTe-detector. The 
present system employs a NaI detector.
In Loviisa all regular assemblies can be veriﬁed 
with the SFAT detector, which is a quick method. 
However, the so called fuel followers can not be 
veriﬁed with the SFAT. Therefore, it is proposed to 
verify these assemblies with the eFORK detector, 
available for this purpose. The eFORK device has a 
CdZnTe, PIC and ﬁssion chamber detectors.
Spent fuel assemblies from Olkiluoto 3 are not in 
the scope of this strategic period, since the operation 
of the plant is not expected to start before 2011.
The main veriﬁcation points will be at the spent 
fuel storages. However at the Olkiluoto 1–2 the 
reactor hall contains many storage positions and 
some assemblies stay there over a long period of 
time. Therefore some campaigns are proposed to 
take place at the reactor hall. In Loviisa facilities 
the storage capacity in the reactor halls is very 
Table 1. STUK’s Non-Destructive Analysis measuring equipment for safeguards.
Method Characteristics/device Note
1 GBUV (Gamma Burn-Up 
Veriﬁer)
Portable, relative eff. 20%, HPGe (High Purity 
Germanium detector) placed behind 3 mm slit 
in spent fuel pool. Ortec Detective X acquired 
in 2006 can be also used for this purpose.
Only Olkiluoto has slits in the pool walls. 
2 eFORK (enhanced FORK 
detector)
Traditional FORK (Neutron/Gamma Ray 
Veriﬁcation) equipped with 20 mm³ CdZnTe 
spectrometer
Transferable. Can be used in Olkiluoto and 
Loviisa. 
3 Olkiluoto SFAT (Spent Fuel 
Attribute Tester)
Completely underwater (NaI detector inside 
watertight cover). Moving telescope.
Operation with Olkiluoto fuel transfer 
machine.
4 Loviisa SFAT (new storage) Completely underwater (detector inside 
watertight cover). No moving parts inside.
Operation with Loviisa fuel transfer 
machine.
5 Loviisa SFAT (old storage) Pipe and supporting structure. The detector 
can be either 20% HPGe or NaI detector.
Pipe has a holder for separate detector 
above water level. HPGe or NaI detectors 
have been used.
6 Additional detector 2 portable HPGe detectors  with measurement 
electronics (see row 1). Canberra UPu 
detector (LEGE detector-based).
Will be used for veriﬁcation of fresh fuel 
and characterisation of special items.
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limited, hence there is no acute need to perform 
measurements there.
3.2.4 Suggested spent fuel 
veriﬁcation campaigns
The strategy suggests the number of campaigns, 
which needs to be performed in order to achieve 
the numerical objectives. Since different types of 
assemblies will be veriﬁed with different methods, 
and during one campaign only one method is cus-
tomarily used, the strategy foresees two campaigns 
annually per facility. For the years 2007–2011 the 
following measurement campaigns are suggested 
by the objectives (Table 2).
3.2.5 Other nuclear material
STUK will also verify other nuclear material in ad-
dition to spent fuel. Fresh nuclear fuel is, according 
to some studies, even higher proliferation risk than 
spent fuel. The strategy foresees annual fresh fuel 
veriﬁcation in some of the Finnish reactor facilities.
3.2.6 Databases
An important part of the measurement strategy is 
the documentation of measurement data and re-
sults. The NDA database has been in use in STUK 
from 1999. In 2007 a new database system, based 
on the Linssi database structure (http://linssi.hut.
ﬁ) will be taken into use in Linux environment.
3.2.7 Training and resources
The new strategy does not change the need for 
resources in the short term. The amount of veri-
ﬁcation activities will slightly intensify because 
of the increase in the amount of nuclear material. 
The main effort with regard to resources is the es-
tablishment of a new database. The in-depth veri-
ﬁcation expertise needs to be spread among more 
inspectors during the strategy period.
3.3 Environmental sampling
A national environmental sampling and analysis 
activity was initiated in 2006. Swipe samples were 
collected at all sites. The programme aims to en-
hance the system of nuclear materials inspections 
by providing evidence on the completeness of dec-
larations on nuclear materials and activities as 
well as on absence of undeclared activities. A swipe 
sample from a nuclear facility (past or present) 
contains millions of particles, among them a few 
from nuclear materials, such as nuclear fuel. The 
composition of those particles provide the analyst 
with information on what the materials are (for), 
where they are from and what processes they have 
been subjected to and when. This information is 
examined to see if the ﬁndings are consistent with 
the declarations. In addition to the needs and ob-
jectives of the State safeguards system, a level of 
understanding of the environmental sampling and 
analysis techniques and their ﬁndings is essential 
also in order to facilitate efﬁcient implementation 
of safeguards in Finland by the IAEA.
Table 2. Suggested spent fuel veriﬁcation activities at the Finnish NPPs for 2007–2011. For Loviisa power plant 
another day is suggested, since spent fuel storage had no C/S system. However the situation is changed, since 
some pools are now sealed.
Year Loviisa Spent fuel storage OL1/2/Spent fuel storage Inspection days 
2007 SFAT: 33 SFAs (1–2 day)  
eFORK 6 SFAs (1–2 days)
SFAT (Spent fuel storage): 45 SFAs (2 days)  
GBUV (OL1/2): 45 SFAs (3 days)
7–9
2008 SFAT: 33 SFAs (1–2 days)  
eFORK 6 SFAs (1–2 days)
SFAT (Spent fuel storage): 45 SFAs (2 days) 
GBUV (OL2/1): 50 SFAs (4 days)
8–10
2009 SFAT: 36 SFAs (1–2 days) 
eFORK 7 SFAs (1–2 days)
SFAT (Spent fuel storage): 45 SFAs (2 days) 
GBUV (Spent fuel storage): 54 SFAs (4 days)
8–10
2010 SFAT: 39 SFAs (1–2 days) 
eFORK 7 SFAs (1–2 days)
SFAT (Spent fuel storage): 45 SFAs (2 days) 
GBUV (OL1/2 reactor hall): 59 SFAs (5 days)
9–11
2011 SFAT: 42 SFAs (1–2 days) 
eFORK 8 SFAs (1–2 days)
SFAT (Spent fuel storage): 45 SFAs (2 days) 
GBUV (OL2/1 reactor hall): 63 SFAs (5 days)
9–11
Table 3. Spent fuel measurements in Finland in 2006.
Location Date
Measured as-
semblies Method
Loviisa spent 
fuel storage
27.–28.3. 3 (+ 19 dummy 
items)
eFORK
Olkiluoto spent 
fuel storage
26.–29.6. 25 GBUV
Loviisa spent 
fuel storage
1.–2.11. 55 SFAT
14
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4 Safeguards implementation
Most of the nuclear material in Finland (see Fig. 
3 and 4) is used as a fuel for the Finnish nuclear 
power plants (NPPs). The main areas relevant to 
the nuclear materials safeguards during 2006 were 
the supply of the nuclear fuel, import, transpor-
tation, storing, handling and use of it. The deci-
sion to build the ﬁfth Finnish power reactor in the 
Olkiluoto NPP area, beginning in 2005, has also 
been taken into account in the plans of the safe-
guards activities.
Figure 3. Uranium amount in Finnish nuclear power plants in 1990–2006.
Figure 4. Plutonium amount in Finnish nuclear power plants in 1990–2006.
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4.1 Additional Protocol (AP)
Additional Protocol came into force in the European 
Union on 30 April 2004. The objective of the AP is 
to assure the IAEA of the absence of undeclared 
nuclear material and activities. The main part of 
this work is the declarations concerning activities 
carried out in the state.
There are three different sets of declarations 
concerning Finland, depending on who is respon-
sible for preparing and submitting a declaration: 
state, (European) Commission or both.
In Finland, the state has delegated its responsi-
bility for the declarations to STUK. STUK collects, 
inspects, reviews and then submits the information 
of those matters for which the state is wholly or 
partly responsible. In other words, STUK prepares 
and submits the declarations under articles 2a(i), 
2a(iv), 2a(viii), 2a(ix), 2a(x), 2b(i) to the IAEA. As 
a “site representative” STUK prepares the site 
declarations under article 2a(iii) to be submitted 
to the Commission, which forwards them to the 
IAEA. The Commission prepares and submits the 
declarations under articles 2a(v)–2a(vii) to the 
IAEA. Depending on the aforementioned respon-
sibilities, STUK and Commission prepare answers 
to any IAEA questions. STUK participates also 
to all IAEA safeguards activities in Finland. The 
Additional Protocol activities so far were:
2004
• Initial declarations:
• STUK submitted the initial declarations to 
IAEA and Commission 8 July 2004,
• Commission submitted initial declarations 
to IAEA 22 September 2004,
• Complementary Access at HYRL site (Univer-
sity of Helsinki, Radiochemistry Laboratory), 24 
h notice, 21 December 2004.
• STUK has submitted 2.a.(ix)(a) declarations to 
IAEA and Commission on a quarterly basis.
2005
• Annual updates:
• STUK provided the updated site declara-
tions to Commission 31 March 2005,
• STUK submitted updated declarations to 
IAEA 4 May 2005,
• Commission submitted updated declara-
tions to IAEA 13 May 2005,
• 2.c questions:
• IAEA submitted three sets of questions to 
STUK and Commission (one for state, one 
for Commission and one for both) 15 July 
2005,
• STUK answered to IAEA questions 8 Sep-
tember 2005,
• Commission answered to IAEA questions 13 
December 2005 and 24 January 2006,
• Complementary Access at Olkiluoto site, 2 h 
notice, 13 September 2005,
• Complementary Access at STUK site, 24 h no-
tice, 7 December 2005,
• STUK has submitted 2.a.(ix)(a) declarations 
to IAEA and Commission on a quarterly basis: 
reported exports have concerned autoclaves ex-
ported to the Russian Federation by Fortum 
Nuclear Services.
2006
• Annual updates:
• STUK provided the updated site declara-
tions to Commission 30 March 2006,
• STUK submitted updated declarations to 
IAEA 10 May 2006,
• Commission submitted updated declara-
tions to IAEA 12 May 2006,
• Complementary Access at Loviisa site, 2 h no-
tice, 17 November 2006,
• STUK has submitted 2.a.(ix)(a) declarations 
to IAEA and Commission on a quarterly basis: 
reported exports have concerned autoclaves ex-
ported to the Russian Federation by Fortum 
Nuclear Services.
In 2006 STUK and the Commission submitted to 
the IAEA 18 declarations concerning Finland. All 
together, 54 declarations have been submitted to 
the IAEA to date. STUK has provided all the infor-
mation that the IAEA has requested in the given 
submission times.
STUK has actively taken part to the experts 
meetings on the topic of AP – the Atomic Questions 
Group meetings, IAEA technical meetings and the 
Commission meetings organised for member states 
as well as ESARDA meetings. An example is IAEA/
VATESI Regional Technical Meeting on Additional 
Protocol Implementation hold in Vilnius, 28 August 
to 01 September 2006. The main topic there were 
to harmonise the state level approaches as well 
16
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as share out the experiences gained so far. In 
2006, STUK also organised, within the Finnish 
Support Programme for the IAEA Safeguards, one 
Complementary Access training course in Finland 
for the IAEA safeguards inspectors. The related on-
site training exercises were organised at Loviisa, 
VTT and STUK sites.
The site declarations are to be veriﬁed by the 
authorities. Although, STUK has access to the 
Finnish nuclear facilities, the declarations gener-
ated by the operators need to be veriﬁed for their 
completeness and correctness. In order to conﬁrm 
the comprehensiveness of the site maps they are 
compared with optical satellite imagery. Satellite 
imagery provides also a tool to monitor activities at 
the ground level remotely. STUK has participated 
in national research project to evaluate the appli-
cability of commercial satellite radar and optical 
imagery in safeguards purposes.
4.2 The Loviisa NPP
Fortum is one of the biggest energy companies 
in Scandinavia. In the past, Fortum was a state-
owned company formed from Imatran Voima and 
Neste. Fortum has electric power plants of many 
types: nuclear, gas, coal, oil, among others.
The nuclear power plant of Fortum Power and 
Heat is located in Loviisa in eastern Finland, 
where there are two nuclear power reactor units 
with common spent fuel storages (material balance 
area WL0V). The electricity generated in Loviisa 
NPP – ca. 10% of the whole electricity production 
in Finland – is used as a primal supply source in 
Finnish electrical network.
Fortum has earlier purchased the fuel for reac-
tor units Loviisa 1 and 2 mainly from the Russian 
Federation as complete assemblies. Nowadays 
about half of the fuel assemblies are imported from 
the Russian Federation and the remaining half 
from Spain. The most of uranium is of Russian ori-
gin. Until 1996 the spent fuel was returned back to 
the Russian Federation. Due to the change in the 
Finnish nuclear legislation the spent fuel has been 
stored in the interim storage since 1996.
In 2006, STUK granted licenses to import fresh 
fuel from Spain. Based on granted import licences, 
in total 210 fuel assemblies containing 25.8 tons of 
uranium were imported to the Loviisa NPP: 102 
fuel assemblies (average uranium enrichment 4%) 
from the Russian Federation and 108 fuel assem-
blies (3.8%) from Spain. The receipts of fuel assem-
blies are stated in Table 4, and total amounts of 
nuclear materials are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 4. Summary of nuclear materials receipts and shipments in 2006.
To From FA LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
W0L1 Spain 116 20 543 –
W0L2 (1/3) Sweden 60 10 162 –
W0L2 (2/3) Sweden 60 10 163 –
W0L2 (3/3) Sweden 6 1 016 –
W0LS W0L2 41 6 894 62
W0LS W0L2 41 6 892 62
W0LS W0L2 41 6 894 62
W0LS W0L1 41 6 746 60 
W0LS W0L1 41 6 742 60
W0LS W0L2 41 6 748 60
WL0V Spain 108 13 533 –
WL0V Russia 102 12 234 –
 W0L1, W0L2 & W0LS = Olkiluoto NPP, WL0V = Loviisa NPP, FA = fuel assembly; LEU = Low-enriched uranium.  
 Note: W0L1 and W0LS shipments are marked only once in to table as W0LS receipts.
Table 5. Fuel assemblies in nuclear power plants on 
December 31, 2006.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
WL0V 4 191/3 380 485 407 4 015
W0L1 1 104/522 188 156 756
W0L2 1 142/574 192 881 862
W0LS 5 412/5 412 919 744 7 621
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) FAs in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa 313 FAs and Olkiluoto 500 FAs per reactor)
STUK-B 74
17
Table 6. Nuclear material amounts in Finland on December 31, 2006.
MBA U-Natural (kg) U-Enriched (kg) U-Depleted (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
WL0V – 485 407 – 4 015 –
W0L1 – 188 156 – a) 756 –
W0L2 – 192 881 – 862 –
W0LS – 919 744 – 7 621 –
WRRF 1 511 60.1 0.002 – –
WFRS 44.7 1.4 823 0.003 2.5
WKK0 2 419 – – – –
WHEL 40.4 0.3 20 0.003 2.5
Othersb) 0.0135 ~0 817 ~0 0.134
WRRF = VTT FiR-1/VTT Processes; WFRS = STUK; WKK0 = OMG Kokkola Chemicals; WHEL = Helsinki University’s laboratory of radiochemistry. 
a) TVO has ca. 10.3 kg DU samples for training and exhibition purposes in Olkiluoto. 
b) Others means the small laboratories and minor NM holders listed in Table 7
The refuelling and maintenance outage of 
Loviisa 1 was performed during 29.7.–24.8.2006, 
and that of Loviisa 2 during 26.8.–1.10.2006. In 
Loviisa 1 refuelling 102 and in Loviisa 2 refuel-
ling 102 fresh fuel assemblies were loaded into 
the cores. Before closing of each reactor, STUK, 
the IAEA and the Commission identiﬁed the fuel 
assemblies in the reactor cores and veriﬁed the 
fuel assemblies in the loading ponds. Loviisa 1 
was inspected on August 6, 2006 and Loviisa 
2 on September 19, 2006. Four routine inspec-
tions were performed together with the IAEA and 
the Commission in February May, September and 
December. In addition, during the inspection in 
September 1, the IAEA also inspected empty con-
tainer going out in Loviisa reactor 2 hall. This in-
spection was launched because the transfer of con-
tainer was during the maintenance break and core 
was open. In 13 and 17 November the pond in new 
spent fuel storage were covered and inspected. In 
addition to this inspection, 2 h CA was performed 
in 17 November. STUK’s measurements in Loviisa 
are reported in Chapter 3.2.
Fortum reported to STUK about its international 
uranium transfers. On the basis of its veriﬁcation 
and assessment, STUK has concluded that Fortum 
has complied with its safeguards obligations.
4.3 The Olkiluoto NPP
Teollisuuden Voima (TVO) is a private company 
owned by Finnish industrial and power companies 
to whom it provides electricity at cost price. TVO 
owns and operates two nuclear power plant units 
and an interim spent fuel storage in Olkiluoto, in 
the municipality of Eurajoki on the west coast of 
Finland. Olkiluoto NPP produces ca. 16% of whole 
electricity production in Finland. In Olkiluoto there 
are three material balance areas (W0L1, W0L2 and 
W0LS).
TVO uses uranium of Australian, Canadian, 
Russian and Chinese origin. Uranium is enriched 
in the Russian Federation or in the EU. The fuel 
assemblies are manufactured in Germany, Spain 
and Sweden.
In 2006, STUK granted two import licences for 
nuclear fuel to TVO. In total, 242 fuel assemblies 
containing 40.9 tons of uranium (~3.5%) was im-
ported to the Olkiluoto NPP, 116 from Spain and 
126 from Sweden. The receipts and shipments of 
fuel assemblies are stated in Table 4, and total 
amounts of nuclear materials are presented in 
Tables 5 and 6.
The refuelling and maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto 1 was performed during 7.5.–30.5.2006 
and that of Olkiluoto 2 during 4.6.–12.6.2006. In 
Olkiluoto 1 refuelling, 110 fresh fuel assemblies 
and in Olkiluoto 2 refuelling, 116 fresh fuel as-
semblies were loaded into the core. Before each 
of the reactors was closed STUK, the IAEA and 
the Commission identiﬁed the fuel assemblies in 
the reactor cores and veriﬁed the fuel assemblies 
in loading ponds. Olkiluoto 1 was inspected on 
25.–26.5.2006 and Olkiluoto 2 on 9.–10.6.2006. 
STUK, the IAEA and the Commission veriﬁed 
the physical inventory in Olkiluoto Spent Fuel 
Storage on December 15, 2006. Four routine in-
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spections were performed by STUK, the IAEA and 
the Commission (for each MBAs) in Olkiluoto: in 
February–March, June, September and December 
2006. STUK’s measurements in Olkiluoto NPP are 
reported in Chapter 3.2.
TVO reported to STUK about its international 
fuel contracts, fuel transfers and shipments. On 
the basis of its veriﬁcation and assessment, STUK 
has concluded that TVO has complied with its safe-
guards obligations.
The Finnish Government granted the licence for 
constructing a new nuclear power plant, Olkiluoto 
3, on 17.2.2005. In this connection, the construc-
tor’s plan for arranging the necessary measures 
for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
was approved by STUK. Construction of the reactor 
vessel and related internal parts of the reactor con-
tinued in Japan. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland gave to the Embassy of Japan the NSG 
assurances on the fuel channels to be shipped to 
Finland by December 31, 2010.
4.4 VTT FiR 1 research reactor
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located 
on other facilities than nuclear power plants. The 
most signiﬁcant of those is VTT research reactor 
(MBA WRRF) in Otaniemi, Espoo. STUK, IAEA 
and Commission safeguards inspectors veriﬁed the 
nuclear material inventory of VTT on 27 June, 
2006. The nuclear material inventory was found to 
be correct. The nuclear material accountancy and 
control were acceptably performed by VTT. The 
inventory of nuclear materials in the end of 2006 is 
presented in Table 6.
4.5 Minor nuclear material holders
The locations outside facilities are STUK (WFRS), 
the Laboratory of Radiochemistry at Helsinki 
University (WHEL) and OMG Kokkola Chemicals 
(WKK0). The amounts of nuclear materials in the 
end of 2006 are presented in Table 6.
STUK’s nuclear activities are mainly storing of 
nuclear materials. STUK has the Central Interim 
Storage for Small-User Radioactive Waste (“Small-
Waste Storage”) located in the NPP waste cave in 
Olkiluoto and the small radionuclide storage at 
STUK.
At moment the Laboratory of Radiochemistry 
of Helsinki University has no nuclear activities 
excluding store of minor amount of nuclear mate-
rial. Anyhow it is possible that they will continue 
the research work with nuclear materials in the 
future.
The only activity of OMG Kokkola Chemicals 
concerning nuclear materials is storing process 
by-products. While obtaining clean cobalt, they 
are getting sodium uranate solution among other 
substances. This sodium uranate solution has been 
timely shipped to Comurhex in France. In 2006 
there were no shipments. OMG Kokkola Chemicals 
has an operation license to store max 20 000 kg of 
uranium in this solution.
In the end of 2006, there were ten other nu-
clear material holders, mostly having some minor 
amounts of nuclear materials, mostly exempted 
materials. Almost all of them have nuclear mate-
rials in the form of depleted uranium shieldings. 
Only three holders, Geological Survey of Finland 
(GTK), Metorex International and University of 
Jyväskylä (Department of Physics) have some oth-
er nuclear materials. GTK has ca. 1.17 g of HEU 
to be used as a spike material in geological studies 
and for mass spectrometry calibrations. Metorex 
has ca. 10 g of natural uranium that they use as 
calibration material for radiation monitoring gates. 
University of Jyväskylä (Department of Physics) 
uses small amounts of NM as a material for manu-
facturing targets or sources or directly to be used 
as targets irradiated with accelerator ion beams 
or as radiation sources in calibration of radiation 
detectors for basic research of nuclear structure. 
A list of minor nuclear material holders including 
close down locations is presented in Table 7.
4.6 Other nuclear items
The Finnish Nuclear Energy legislation regulates 
also nuclear items other than nuclear material. 
Possession, transfer, imports and exports of those 
items requires a licence or at least a notiﬁcation 
to STUK. In 2006, STUK granted to Fortum Power 
and Heat licenses to import neutron detectors from 
German and in-core sensors from Canada as well 
as to export parts of control rod drive mechanism 
and technology to German. STUK also granted to 
TVO four licences to import control rods (2 licenc-
es) and zirconium tubes (2) and two licences to ex-
port zirconium tubes. In addition STUK granted an 
export and import licence to VTT research reactor 
for control rod drivers to be serviced in USA. The 
Ministry of Trade and Industry granted to Fortum 
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Nuclear Services a license to export APROS soft-
ware to Libya. It also granted to Fortum Power 
and Heat a licence to import neutron detectors 
from France and to Radiochemistry Laboratory of 
Helsinki University to import U-235 sample from 
the Russian Federation.
4.7 Geological repository
Underground facilities for ﬁnal disposal of spent 
create a new challenge to the safeguards society. 
The main concern is that after safe disposal in 
the subsurface, there is still a need to have a cred-
ible assurance about the absence of safeguards-
relevant activities, although the nuclear materials 
are not accessible or re-veriﬁable using the tra-
ditional safeguards technologies. In order to fa-
cilitate the IAEA’s State level analysis about the 
absence of undeclared nuclear activities, the imple-
menting company was obligated to produce timely 
safeguards-relevant documents covering the whole 
lifetime of the repository. The implementation was 
commenced with the underground excavation, be-
fore of the traditional time lines for conventional 
nuclear facilities.
In summer 2004, the ﬁrst concrete step in the 
Finnish ﬁnal repository was taken as the under-
ground excavation of the geological site characteri-
sation premises called ONKALO begun. The ﬁrst 
access tunnel to ONKALO most probably will be a 
part of the ﬁnal repository in the future as one of 
the access routes. In connection with this, the im-
plementing company Posiva Oy appointed a person 
responsible for nuclear non-proliferation control of 
the ONKALO and prepared a Safeguards Manual 
to be applied in the similar manner as the Nuclear 
Material Handbook of a licensed material holder 
already in the pre-nuclear phase of the repository. 
The updated version of the Safeguards Manual 
was approved by STUK in summer 2006.
During the year 2006 STUK carried out 6 safe-
guards inspections to verify the as-built design in-
formation describing the excavated rock volumes. 
In addition, STUK carried out 26 inspection activi-
ties to ensure the sustainability of the long-term 
safety analysis of the planned repository. Two IAEA 
inspectors participated in one of these inspections 
as observers (ﬁg. 5). In addition, STUK carried out 
Table 7. Amounts of nuclear material at minor nuclear material holders.
Company
Nuclear material (kg)
MBA + use of NMU-dep U-nat U-Leu U-Heu Pu Th
Geological Survey of Finland 
(GTK)
– – – 0.001174 – – SF 0293 CA, Minor NM activities
Finnair Engineering 15.5 – – – – – SF 0302 CA, DU radiation shielding
Rautaruukki, Raahe Works 163 – – – – – SF 0303 CA, DU radiation shielding
Inspecta 304 – – – – – SF 0304 CA, DU radiation shielding
Outokumpu Stainless 100.98 – – – – – W0KU, DU radiation shielding
Centre for Technical Training, 
Metal and Machinery
15 – – – – – DU radiation shielding
Polartest 163.2 – – – – – WF1P. DU radiation shielding
MAP Medical Technologies 55 – – – – – SF 0325 CA, DU radiation shielding
Metorex International – 0.0105 – – – – U-nat standards
University of Jyväskylä,  
Dept. of Physics
– 0.003 – ~0 ~0 0.134 WDPJ, Basic research
Figure 5. IAEA inspector visiting in ONKALO as an 
observer of STUK’s ONKALO inspection.
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one inspection to analyse the performance of the 
safeguards system elements at Posiva in order to 
improve the National Safeguards System.
The annual report of Nuclear Safeguards in 
Finland in 2005 (Hämäläinen 2006) including the 
repository issues was submitted to the IAEA in 
May 2006. Safeguards System for the ﬁnal dis-
posal was presented by Martikka et al. (2006) at 
the IAEA Safeguards Symposium. The safeguards 
elements in DIV and area monitoring contain 
new type geodetic, geophysical and remote sensing 
techniques that have to be adjusted and applied ac-
cording to the geological site and facility type. The 
present methodology to use laser scanning, survey-
ing, seismic monitoring and satellite imagery was 
demonstrated by the Finnish Support programme 
(Okko & Rautjärvi 2006) and discussed in the 
ASTOR group meetings that assist the IAEA to 
develop its approaches and methodologies to safe-
guard geological repositories.
4.8 IAEA safeguards
The IAEA safeguards in Finland is based on the 
Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193) between the 
non-nuclear weapon states of the EU, the European 
Atomic Energy Community and the IAEA. The 
IAEA and Euratom safeguards have agreed on co-
operation (New Partnership Approach, NPA) with 
the aim of reducing the undue duplication of ef-
fort. In Finland this has not decreased the number 
of inspection days. There is still overlap with the 
Commission and IAEA activities. In 2006 the IAEA 
safeguards activities were carried out without sig-
niﬁcant changes compared with the previous year.
The facility attachments (FA) according to the 
Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193) were not in 
force in 2006 in Finland. This situation is not ap-
preciated but it has not negatively inﬂuenced the 
implementation. Moreover, drafting of “Safeguards 
Agreement for the Finnish geological repository” 
was initiated with the IAEA in 2004. Consequently, 
a meeting between the IAEA, Posiva and STUK 
was organised at the Agency in September 2005 to 
establish formal safeguards approach between the 
State and the Agency already in the pre-nuclear 
phase of the repository. The implementation of the 
IAEA safeguards at the repository is, however, not 
yet formally implemented.
STUK is responsible for the approval of the 
IAEA inspectors for Finland. After receiving the 
information about the new inspector candidates, 
STUK sends the requests for comments to those 
nuclear material holders who hold construction 
and operating licenses for nuclear facilities. In 
2006, all proposed inspectors (altogether 28) were 
approved to inspect Finnish nuclear installations. 
According to the information STUK has, altogether 
327 IAEA inspectors had the inspection rights in 
Finland at the end of 2006.
Inspections and inspection person days of 
STUK, IAEA and Commission are presented in 
ﬁgures 6 and 7. In 2006 STUK has received 27 
statements by the IAEA concerning the inspections 
it has carried out in Finland and 8 conclusions con-
cerning activities during material balance period.
4.9 Euratom safeguards
The Treaty of the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom Treaty) and the EU 
Safeguards Regulation (No 302/2005) based on the 
Treaty form the foundation for the Euratom safe-
guards. Nuclear material holders and producers 
of ores that contain uranium or thorium have the 
responsibility to maintain the nuclear material ac-
countancy system and submit reports and other 
data to the Commission in Luxembourg. The cop-
ies of the reports and other data have to be sent to 
STUK.
Based on Basic Technical Characteristics pro-
vided by the operators the Commission prepares 
particular safeguards provisions (PSPs) for each 
material balance area. For the Loviisa NPP and 
the VTT Research reactor (FiR 1 reactor) the PSPs 
came into force in 1998. The Commission has asked 
for and got the comments on the PSPs from STUK 
and TVO in 2001 and again 2006, but the PSPs 
concerning the Olkiluoto NPP are still not in force.
STUK is responsible of the consulting (Euratom 
Treaty, article 81) of the Commission’s inspectors 
for Finland. STUK has sent the requests of the 
Commission safeguards inspectors for comments 
to the nuclear material holders. In 2006, altogether 
six new Commission safeguards inspectors were 
appointed to inspect Finnish nuclear installations. 
181 Commission inspectors had the inspection 
rights in Finland on January 1, 2007.
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Figure 6. Number of inspections (incl. CA) carried out by the Commission, IAEA and STUK at Finnish facilities 
2001–2006.
Figure 7. Number of inspection person days during inspections (incl. CA) carried out by the Commission, IAEA 
and STUK at Finnish facilities 2001–2006.
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Inspections and inspection person days of 
STUK, IAEA and Commission are presented in 
ﬁgures 6 and 7. The IAEA statements were sent 
to the Commission, and the Commission amended 
its own conclusions to the statements before pro-
viding them to the State. The conclusions by the 
Commission were in line with the IAEA remarks 
– there were no outstanding questions at the end 
of 2006.
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5 Transport and border control of 
radioactive and nuclear materials
The requirements for transport of radioactive and 
nuclear material are given in the regulations re-
garding transport of dangerous goods. The pur-
pose of these regulations is to prevent the possible 
hazard that the transport of dangerous goods may 
cause to people, environment and property. Based 
on the regulations STUK is the competent author-
ity regarding radioactive material transport. The 
consignor has the biggest responsibility concerning 
the transport of radioactive material; also other ac-
tors involved in transport, such as the carrier and 
the consignee, share the responsibility regarding 
the safety of the transport. 
In addition to the dangerous goods transport 
regulations, transport of nuclear material is sub-
ject to licence as stipulated in the Nuclear Energy 
Act. These licences are usually granted for a longer 
period and no new transport licences were granted 
in 2006. Before a package can be used for ﬁssile 
material transport, the package design must be 
approved by STUK. In 2006 STUK approved four 
package designs by validation of a foreign cer-
tiﬁcate. Every nuclear material transport needs an 
approved plan from STUK. A physical protection 
plan and a certiﬁcate of nuclear liability insurance 
must also be delivered to STUK before the trans-
port takes place. Import and export of radioactive 
and nuclear material is subject to licence. In 2006 
STUK approved three transport plans for import of 
fresh nuclear fuel to Finland from Spain, Sweden 
and Russia. The fuel from Sweden and Spain 
was transported on trucks or trailers which were 
shipped by sea to a Finnish harbour and driven by 
road to the power plant. The fuel from Russia was 
transported by rail over the border to Vainikkala, 
where it was loaded onto trucks and driven to 
Loviisa power plant.
For radioactive material other than nuclear ma-
terial no separate transport licence or approval of 
transport plan is obligatory. The transport of such 
radioactive material is under safety licence that 
is needed for the use of radiation and granted by 
STUK. Approximately 20 000 transports of radio-
active material are performed per year. According 
to Radiation Act the licensee shall assure that both 
the package and the mode used for the transport 
fulﬁl the safety requirements, and that the carrier 
has all the information and instructions necessary 
for safe transport. In addition the regulations con-
cerning transport of dangerous goods shall also be 
followed. In some speciﬁc cases when the require-
ments can not be met, STUK may grant a license 
for transport with special arrangements based 
on separate application. In granting such licence 
STUK must however be able to conﬁrm that the 
required safety level is achieved.
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6 The Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is an important part of the international 
regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. It bans any nuclear weapon test explosions in 
any environment. This ban is aimed at constrain-
ing the development and qualitative improvement 
of nuclear weapons, including also the development 
of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, and was opened for signature 
in New York on September 24, 1996. The Treaty 
will enter into force after it has been ratiﬁed by 
the 44 states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states 
participated in the 1996 session of the Conference 
on Disarmament, and possess nuclear power or 
research reactors.
A global veriﬁcation regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. 
The veriﬁcation regime consists of the following 
elements: International Monitoring System (IMS), 
consultation and clariﬁcation process, On-Site 
Inspections (OSI) and conﬁdence-building meas-
ures.
Finland has signed and ratiﬁed the CTBT. In 
addition to complying with the basic requirement 
of the Treaty not to carry out any nuclear weapon 
tests, Finland takes part in the international moni-
toring network aimed at verifying compliance with 
the obligations of the Treaty in a global scale.
In the CTBT framework, the National Authority 
is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK has two 
roles: STUK operates both the Finnish National 
Data Centre and one of the radionuclide labora-
tories designated in the Treaty. The main tasks 
of the National Data Centre are to analyse data 
received from the International Monitoring System 
and to inform the National Authority about the 
results. The radionuclide laboratory contributes to 
the International Monitoring System by providing 
support in the radionuclide analyses and in the 
quality control of the radionuclide station network. 
Other national collaborators are the Institute of 
Seismology and the Ministry of Defence.
During 2006 the National Data Centre par-
ticipated in the meetings of the working group 
of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT 
Organization, which is a policy making organ 
for the technical development of the veriﬁcation 
regime. The National Data Centre provided a 
training course for National Data Centre manag-
ers from developing countries (Fig. 8). The course 
was funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
The National Data Centre continued developing 
its own routine monitoring system for the data re-
ceived from the international veriﬁcation network.
Figure 8. Hands-on gamma spectrum analysis.
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The nuclear test conducted by North Korea on 
9 October 2006 was detected by the seismological 
monitoring stations of the International Monitoring 
System. The test was carried out underground, 
which minimizes or blocks the radioactive releases. 
While the test could not be detected by the certiﬁed 
aerosol stations of the IMS, radioactive traces of 
xenon that could have been connected to the test 
were observed at one of the noble gas monitoring 
test installations, not yet certiﬁed. This underlines 
the importance of completing the installation and 
certiﬁcation of the IMS network, so that the veriﬁ-
cation system may be fully functional upon Entry 
into Force of the Treaty.
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7 International safeguards cooperation
7.1 Safeguards co-operation 
in the neighbour areas
The safeguards co-operation with the neighbour-
ing areas is motivated by the need for continu-
ing enhancement of the regional security environ-
ment. Accordingly, Finland had a safeguards sup-
port programme for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
as well as continue its co-operation with Russian 
Federation in this area. The focus during this year 
has been on the cooperation with the Russian au-
thorities and collaboration with Ukraine in search 
for mutually beneﬁcial areas for future coopera-
tion.
The resources of about 150 000 Euros made 
available by the Foreign Ministry were, during 
the year 2006, used within the Co-operation pro-
gramme with Russian Federation. The projects 
covered review of six regulations, dealing for ex-
ample with quality assurance of some fuel cycle 
activities and accountancy and control of radioac-
tive sources, substances and waste. Both are of 
particular importance. The ﬁrst one documents a 
change in the role of the authority of the Russian 
administration. The authority is required to put 
out the requirements for the industry to comply 
with – not instructions to be followed. The author-
ity is also required to inspect to ensure compliance. 
Thus, the administrative philosophy is in transfor-
mation from instruction oriented to performance 
oriented one. Challenge is unprecedented. Long 
term support is required. The new regulation in the 
area of control of radioactive materials other than 
nuclear represents something unique in the world. 
The principles and practices from nuclear material 
accountancy have been applied in this area in a 
practical way. The required work has been already 
accomplished in Nuclear Power Plants. The big 
challenge is now the establishment of the initial in-
ventories in all areas of national economy. It is ex-
pected that technical, expert and ﬁnancial support 
will be required by Russia so as to be in a position 
to accomplish the work with a credible outcome.
The spent fuel measurement device (SFAT) 
for the demonstration purposes at Kola NPP was 
constructed in STUK workshop and its functions 
tested at Loviisa NPP. The documentation, certiﬁ-
cation and the demonstration and delivery to the 
Rostechnadsor for its use is planned to take place 
in 2007.
STUK and the Finnish Customs Authority vis-
ited St. Petersburg Customs Academy and the sea 
port. The impressive facilities and work done by the 
Russian Customs contributed to the changes in the 
Course provided by the Finnish Customs Authority 
and STUK for the Russian Customs Ofﬁcers. The 
Course was given to the satisfaction of the audi-
ence. Also IAEA considered that the course as such 
will ﬁt to its Material Security Programme’s deliv-
erables. Subsequently, the new bilateral Course be-
tween Finland and Russia as well as the Regional 
Course in the Baltic Area was included to the IAEA 
Programme for 2007. The bilateral course agenda 
is further enhanced, including the ﬁrst part on the-
ory and learning exercises in the Helsinki harbour 
and at the Vaalimaa boarder station. The second 
part will focus on technical and practical exercises 
at the St. Petersburg Customs Academy, Sea Port 
and at the adjacent air port.
Various visits were conducted to occasions in 
Ukraine to assess the situation and identify the 
relevant parties and, to the extent possible, also 
determine the areas of interest. These interactions 
led to the understanding that Ukraine is clearly 
committed to transformation of its regulatory cul-
ture towards the one like we have in Finland. 
Relevant capacity has been developing during the 
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past year of collaboration. This is however not 
directly available for the regulatory authority’s 
use. The related issues must be clariﬁed at the 
governmental policy-making level. Immediate sup-
port Finland and STUK may provide in the area 
of the implementation of the Additional Protocol 
obligations. Ukraine and IAEA is hoping that 
ex-perts of STUK can be made available to help. 
In such a case that Finland is willing and able to 
make more signiﬁcant contributions to the security 
of materials and facilities in Ukraine, STUK and 
the two nuclear services as well as other relevant 
industrial actors should be provided with an op-
portunity to get acquainted with some of the key 
projects among the 40 presented by the Regulatory 
Authority SNRC of Ukraine.
7.2 Finnish support programme 
to the IAEA safeguards
For 2006 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs allocated 
190,000 Euros for the Finnish Safeguards Support 
Programme to the IAEA (FINSP) which was imple-
mented under the coordination of STUK. The key 
areas of the programme in 2006 were training of 
the IAEA inspectors and development of veriﬁca-
tion methods.
In 2006 FINSP organised one training course for 
IAEA inspectors concerning implementation of the 
Additional Protocol. During the course the train-
ees went through simulated Additional Protocol 
Complementary Access. The course was held at 
STUK headquarters, VTT Research Reactor site 
and Loviisa NPP. The help of VTT and Loviisa NPP 
personnel is acknowledged.
In addition STUK launched together with the 
IAEA training section a project to produce training 
video for the IAEA inspectors. The product will be 
ready in 2007 and will support the training section 
in its efforts for years.
In development of veriﬁcation methods FINSP 
had two major tasks, which continue in 2006. 
Firstly, VTT developed a methodology to produce 
quality assurance samples for IAEA laboratories. 
During the work two sets of standardised uranium 
particles were produced. The ultimate objective of 
this task is to introduce these particles to QA sam-
ples in known amounts. Secondly, FINSP took part 
in joint task of EC, Sweden and Hungary to de-
velop new type of veriﬁcation device for IAEA use. 
This device, known as Passive Gamma Emission 
Tomographic Veriﬁer, is expected to be capable to 
detect single missing pin inside PWR assembly. 
The prototype is expected to be ready for testing 
in 2007. The project was presented in 2006 IAEA 
safeguards symposium in Vienna (Honkamaa 
et al. Prototype tomographic partial defect test-
er, Symposium on International Safeguards, 
Addressing veriﬁcation challenges, Vienna, Austria 
16–20, October 2006, Book of Extended Synopses, 
IAEA-CN-148/171P).
7.3 Activities in ESARDA
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA), 
and has nominated Finnish experts to committees 
and most of the working groups. In addition, STUK 
participated in ESARDA’s working groups, espe-
cially the Integrated Safeguards working group 
(IS WG). STUK contributed to the ESARDA’s sym-
posium in Luxembourg. STUK participated in the 
ESARDA Executive Board meetings and STUK’s 
representative was chosen to a next Vice-President 
of ESARDA (Figure 9).
Figure 9. President Göran Dahlin (SKI) and Vice-Presi-
dent Elina Martikka (STUK) of ESARDA for the years 
2007–2008.
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7.4 Namibian IAEA trainee 
working in STUK
Safeguards expert Ms. Helena Itamba from 
Namibia worked at STUK from August to October 
as an IAEA fellowship visitor (Fig. 10). Ms. Itamba 
is the deputy director of Controlled Minerals and 
Minerals Development Division (Directorate of 
Mines) within the Ministry of Mining and Energy 
in Namibia. Purpose of the visit was to come and 
learn from STUK as Namibia is in the process to 
establish institutional framework under the Atomic 
Energy and Radiation protection Act for report and 
control of Nuclear material, meet obligations under 
international treaties an conventions within the 
scope of IAEA mandate and to strengthen safe-
guards and ensure the safety and security of our 
country and citizens as more mines are foreseen to 
open in the near future and safeguards activities 
are going to increase. Nuclear activities in Namibia 
consist mainly of uranium mining.
7.5 Other international activities
During Finland’s EU Presidency, the second half 
of the year 2006, STUK organised the Meeting of 
the Safeguards Experts for the Atomic Questions 
Group in Finland. In the meeting the main topic 
was to clarify the roles and responsibilities in the 
Euratom safeguards; Member States, Commission 
and relations to the IAEA safeguards. Also the 
Commission’s paper “Implementing the Euratom 
Treaty Safeguards, IETS” was discussed. In the 
end of November the Safeguards Experts met in 
Luxembourg, and the Commission’s IETS-paper 
was ﬁnished by the Member States.
Figure 10. Ms. Helena Itamba from the Ministry of 
Mining and Energy in Namibia discussing with Juha 
Rautjärvi (STUK).
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8 Conclusions
All the actions including nuclear materials and oth-
er nuclear items were carried out according to the 
Finnish nuclear legislation and regulations. Also 
the requirements of the international agreements 
Figure 11. The STUK’s safeguards staff on its self assessment seminar.
have been fulﬁlled. Based on results of STUK’s 
regulation it is possible to conclude that the nu-
clear materials and other nuclear items were used 
for intended, peaceful, use.
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ANNEX 1 International agreements
A list of valid legislation, treaties and agreements 
concerning safeguards of nuclear materials and 
other nuclear items at the end of 2006 in Finland 
(reference to Finnish Treaty Series, FTS).
1. Nuclear Energy Act, 11 December, 1987/990 as 
amended.
2. Nuclear Energy Decree, 12 February, 1988/161 
as amended.
3. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
4. The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency in Implementation of Article III, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 September 
1997. Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
5. The Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-
tween the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ire-
land, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered 
into force on 30 April 2004.
6. The Treaty establishing the European Atom-
ic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 
March 1957:
• Regulation No 5, amendment of the list in 
Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
• Regulation No 9, article 197, point 4 of the 
Euratom Treaty, on determining concentra-
tions of ores, 2 February 1960.
7. Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005, 
8 February 2005
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 set-
ting up a Community regime for the control of 
Exports of dual-use items and technology as 
amended.
9. The Agreement with the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69).  Articles I, II, III 
and X expired on 20 February 1999.
10. The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 ex-
pired on 1.12.2004.
11. The Agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 
41/70). Articles 1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
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12. The Agreement between Sweden and Finland 
concerning guidelines on export of nuclear ma-
terials, technology and equipment (FTS 20/83).
13. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Cana-
da and Canada concerning the uses of nuclear 
materials, equipment, facilities and information 
transferred between Finland and Canada (FTS 
43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent by 
the Agreement with the Government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic En-
ergy, 6 October 1959 as amended.
14. The Agreement on implementation of the Agree-
ment with Finland and Canada concerning the 
uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland 
and Canada (FTS 43/84).
15. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Aus-
tralia concerning the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement between the Government of Aus-
tralia and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity concerning transfer of nuclear material 
from Australia to the European Atomic Energy 
Community.
16. The Agreement for Cooperation with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the USA.
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ANNEX 2 IAEA, Commission and STUK 
safeguards inspections in 2006
General information Inspections Inspection  person days
MBA Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 21–22 Feb. Routine inspection 3 3 4 3 3 8
WL0V (20+) 24 Feb. Routine inspection 1 1 1 2 2 3
W0L2 20 March Extra inspection 1 1 1 1
WL0V 27–28 March eFORK [IAEA observer] 1 1 2 4
WL0V 23 May Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L2 25–26 May PIV 1 1 1 2 2 4
ONKALO 31 May DIV [IAEA visitors (2)] 1 1 2 2
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 8–10 June Routine inspection + OL1 PIV 3 3 3 4 4 8
W0LS 26–29 June STUK GBUV (+ES) 1 8
WRRF 27 June PIV 1 1 1 1 1 2
W0L1 29 June OL1 POST PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
ONKALO 4 July DIV 1 1
WL0V 6 Aug. Loviisa 1 core veriﬁcation 1 1 1 1 1 1
ONKALO 16 Aug. 1 1
WL0V 1 Sep. Cask inspection in Loviisa 2 1 1 1 1
WL0V 19 Sep. Loviisa 2 core veriﬁcation + PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 21–22 Sep. Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 3
WL0V 10 Oct. Loviisa POST PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
WFRS 11 Oct. “PIV” 1 1 1 1 1 1
ONKALO 26 Oct. 1 1
WL0V 1-3 Nov. STUK SFAT (+ES) 1 6
WL0V 13+17 Nov. Covering of ponds in KMPH 1 1 1 2 2 2
WHEL 14 Nov. STUK ES 1 2
WL0V 17 Nov. CA 1 1 1 1 1 1
ONKALO 11 Dec. DIV + system inspection 1 4
WL0V 12 Dec. Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 14–15 Dec. Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 3
TOTAL 28 24 36 34 28 72
Note: In Olkiluoto, inspections are counted per MBA. DIV = Design Information Veriﬁcation, PIV = Physical Inventory Veriﬁcation, ES = Environmental Sampling,  
CA = Complementary Access
